Abstract-Cooperative jamming has been demonstrated to be an effective means to provide secret wireless communications and yet this is realized at the expense of the power consumption of the friendly jammers. This paper considers the scenario where friendly jammers harvest energy wirelessly from the signal transmitted by the source, and then use only the harvested energy to transmit the jamming signals for improving the secrecy of the communications of the source to the destination. In particular, we investigate the use of multi-antenna harvest-andjam (HJ) helpers in a multi-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF) relay wiretap channel assuming that the direct link between the source and destination is broken. Our goal is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate at the destination subject to the transmit power constraints of the AF relay and HJ helpers. In the case of perfect channel state information (CSI), the joint optimization of the artificial noise (AN) covariance for jamming and the AF beamforming matrix is presented as well as a suboptimal solution with lower complexity based on semidefinite relaxation (SDR) which is tight in this case. For the practical case where the CSI is imperfect at both the relay and the HJ helpers, we provide the formulation of the robust optimization for maximizing the worst-case secrecy rate. Using SDR techniques, a near-optimal robust scheme is proposed. Numerical results are provided to validate the effectiveness of the HJ protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pressing demand for high data rate in wireless communications networks coupled with the fact that mobile devices are physically small and power-limited by batteries, has driven the notion of energy harvesting (EH) to become a promising resolution for green communications [1, 2] . Among the varied available resources for EH, radio-frequency (RF)-enabled wireless energy transfer (WET) has aroused an upsurge of interest for its long operation range, ubiquitous existence in the electromagnetic radiation, and effective energy multicasting, which motivates the fundamentally new paradigm in wireless communications, namely, simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) (see [3] [4] [5] [6] and the references therein). A typical SWIPT system of practical interest consists of one access point (AP) that has constant power supply and broadcasts wireless signals to a group of user terminals, among which some decode information, typically referred to as information receivers (IRs), while others scavenge energy from ambient radio signals, named energy receivers (ERs). This gives rise to a challenging physical (PHY)-layer security issue that the ERs may eavesdrop the information sent to the IRs due to their close proximity to the AP for operating with EH-enabled receiving power. To resolve this issue, in [7] [8] [9] , several researchers presented various approaches to achieve secret communication to the IRs and maximize the energy simultaneously transferred to the ERs or to satisfy the individual EH requirement for the ERs and maximize the secrecy rate for the IR, by advocating the dual use of the artificial noise (AN) or jamming.
However, these works all assumed that the ERs cause threat to the SWIPT systems for their attempt to intercept the information destined to the legitimate IR, which may be over-protective. On the contrary, it is also possible that some of these ERs are cooperative, especially, when they are wirelessly EH-enabled. Following the recent advances in wireless powered communications networks [10, 11] , this paper proposes a self-sustaining harvest-and-jam (HJ) relay protocol, where in the first transmission phase a single-antenna transmitter transfers information to a multiple-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF) relay and power to a group of EH-enabled idle helpers simultaneously, while in the second transmission phase, the AF relay amplifies and then forwards the confidential information to the receiver under the protection of the AN generated by the helpers using the energy harvested from their received signals.
The physical (PHY)-layer security issues in the rapidly developing cooperative networks such as heterogeneous networks (HetNets), device-to-device (D2D) communications, relay networks and etc., have understandably drawn significant attention. Cooperative schemes, in particular, cooperative jamming, for providing secrecy communications have been widely studied [12] [13] [14] [15] . The main idea is to assist the transmitter in the secrecy transmission by generating an AN to interfere with the eavesdropper via extra spatial degree of freedom introduced by either multiple antennas or external trusted helpers [16] [17] [18] . However, all of these employed ANs rely on additional supply of power and thus incur extra system costs. Meanwhile, collaborative use of relays to form effective beams jamming the eavesdropper, i.e., (secure) collaborative relay beamforming, has been studied for relay-wiretap channels with single eavesdropper in [19] , multiple eavesdroppers (AF relays) in [20] , and multiple eavesdroppers (decode-and-forward (DF) relays) in [21] . All of these works, however, assumed the availability of perfect channel state information (CSI).
Although [22] proposed the robust AF relay beamformer design with respect to (w.r.t.) the eavesdropper's channel, the solutions are suboptimal and very much rely on accurate CSI of the relay-to-legitimate receiver channel.
The assumption of having perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers appears to be too ideal because the eavesdroppers, despite being legitimate users, wish to hide from the transmitter without being cooperative in the stage of channel estimation. Even if they are registered users and bound to help the transmitter in obtaining their CSIs to facilitate their own communication, the CSIs at the transmitter will change due to mobility and Doppler effect, and will be outdated. Moreover, even for the legitimate users like the receiver and cooperative helpers, the estimated CSIs may also be subject to quantization errors due to the limited capacity of the feedback channel, although the inaccuracy is reasonably assumed less severe than that for the eavesdroppers. To tackle this issue, lots of state-of-art schemes have been developed ([23] and the references therein), among which the worst-case secrecy rate is often used to formulate the robust secrecy rate maximization problem [8, 24, 25] . The robust transmit covariance design for the secrecy rate maximization in a multiple-input single-output (MISO) channel overheard by multi-antenna eavesdroppers was considered in [24] while the enhanced secrecy performance was achieved by introducing a friendly jammer in the same scenario [25] , where a joint optimization of the robust transmit covariance and power allocation between the source and the helper was studied via geometric programming. More recently, [8] studied a joint robust design of the information beams, the AN and the energy signals for the SWIPT networks with quality constraints.
Of particular relevance to our work is [26] which solved a general problem that jointly optimizes the AF matrices and AN covariances in a relay wiretap channel with multiple multiantenna AF relays and multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers via a worst-case robust formulation. While our network model is similar, the difference of our work from the joint AF-AN technique in [26] is threefold. First of all, in this paper, the AN generated by the friendly jammers also depends on their respective channels from the transmitter for WET in the first transmission phase. Second, we consider the worst-case secrecy rate maximization in the more challenging condition with imperfect CSIs associated with both the eavesdropper and the legitimate receiver, which needs to be judiciously dealt with to fit the semidefinite programming formulation. Third, the technique in [26, Proposition 1 ] cannot be applied directly to our formulation since the AN beams and the AF information are delivered via different channels in ours. As a result, in addition to our new solutions in the case of perfect CSI, our novel robust optimization approach which simultaneously incorporates imperfect CSIs related to all HJ helpers, has not been addressed in the literature.
It is worth pointing out that employing a wireless-powered friendly jammer in enhancing PHY-layer security for a direct transmission protocol has been investigated in [27] , in which the "harvesting" blocks and "jamming" blocks were well exploited to compose four different types of harvestingjamming cycles, and the long-time behaviour of the proposed protocol, in terms of the throughput, was analyzed based on the probability of information transfer. Moreover, the parameters for this fixed-rate design of secure communication protocol has also been optimized to maximize the throughput subject to the secrecy outage requirement. Compared to [27] , which focused mainly on the dedicated scheduling of "harvest" and "jam" operations and its long-term performance, ours are concerned with adaptive rate/power optimization in the presence of multiple HJ helpers to achieve higher worst-case secrecy rate under a more realistic CSI assumption. Note that in this paper, we assume that the channel between the transmitter and the AF relay is perfectly known [22, 26] and there is no direct link between the transmitter and the receiver or the eavesdropper, which is a common assumption in the concerned AF relay wiretap channel [19, 20] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the AF relaying SWIPT system model and describes the HJ protocol. Section III presents the secrecy rate maximization problem with perfect CSI and gives the joint-optimal AN covariance and AF beamforming matrices as well as a complexity-reduced suboptimal solution. Section IV proposes effective solutions tackling the case of imperfect CSI via the worst-case robust formulation. In Section V, numerical results are provided to compare different schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations-We use the upper case boldface letters for matrices and lower case boldface letters for vectors. The superscripts (·)
T , (·) † and (·) H denote the transpose, conjugate and conjugate transpose, respectively. Also, tr(·) and E[·] stand for the trace of a matrix and the statistical expectation for random variables, respectively. Likewise, vec(A) is defined as a column vector obtained by stacking the rows of A on top of one another, while null(A) denotes the null space of A. ⊗ represents the Kronecker product of two matrices. In addition, the notation A 0 indicates that A is a positive semidefinite matrix and I denotes an identity matrix with appropriate size. Furthermore, · represents the Euclidean norm of a vector, while P r (·) stands for the probability of an input random event. Finally, [x] + denotes max(0, x).
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a cooperative relay wiretap channel for SWIPT over a given frequency band as shown in Fig. 1 . It is assumed that there is a transmitter, named Alice, sending confidential messages to the legitimate IR, named Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, named Eve, with the assistance of a multiantenna AF relay and K ERs willing to act as jammers. The ERs or helpers are collected by the set H helper = {H 1 , . . . , H K }, and are assumed to be closer to the transmitter than the AF relay in order that they can harvest sufficient amount of energy to help secure the communications between Alice and Bob by sending AN jamming signals. Alice, Bob and Eve are all assumed to be equipped with single antenna, while the AF relay and each of the K helpers have N t antennas.
Suppose that there are two consecutive equal-slot transmission phase for the AF relaying protocol. For the first transmission phase, the transmitter transmits a confidential message to the relay while simultaneously transferring energy to the K helpers; for the second transmission phase, the normal relay amplifies and forwards the message to the intended receiver (Bob) while the K helpers perform cooperative jamming using their respective harvested power from the first transmission phase, to compromise the eavesdropper (Eve). In this paper, we assume a quasi-static fading environment and for convenience denote h 0 ∈ C Nt×1 as the complex channel from the transmitter to the relay and h k ∈ C Nt×1 , k = 1, . . . , K, as that from the transmitter to the kth helper; denoteh 0 as the transpose of the complex channel from the relay to Bob andh k ∈ C Nt×1 , k = 1, . . . , K, as that from H k to Bob; denote g 0 ∈ C Nt×1 and g k ∈ C Nt×1 , k = 1, . . . , K, as those from the relay and H k to Eve, respectively. In the first transmission phase, the baseband received signal at the AF relay can be expressed as
where s is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variable, denoted by s ∼ CN (0, 1) and n r is the additive complex noise vector, denoted by n r ∼ CN (0, σ 2 r I). In addition, P s denotes the given transmit power at the transmitter (Alice). Furthermore, the received signal at each helper H k is expressed as
where, n ′ k is the additive noise, denoted by n
On the other hand, for WET, the harvested energy 1 of H k in each unit slot is given by
where 0 < η ≤ 1 denotes the EH efficiency. In the second transmission phase, the linear operation at the AF relay can be represented by
where x ′ ∈ C Nt×1 is the transmit signal at the AF relay and W ∈ C Nt×Nt is the beamforming matrix. Note that the transmit power of the AF relay can be shown as
which is constrained by the maximum available power at the AF relay, i.e., P r , which is given by
In the meantime, each HJ helper, H k , will help generate an AN n k ∈ C Nt×1 to interfere with Eve. Similar to [16] , we assume that n k 's are independent CSCG vectors denoted by n k ∼ CN (0, Q k ), ∀k, since the worst-case noise for the eavesdropper Eve is known to be Gaussian. In addition, each H k has a transmit power constraint due to its harvested power in the previous transmission phase, i.e., tr(
The received signal at Bob can thus be expressed as
where n b ∼ CN (0, σ 2 b I) is the additive noise at Bob. Similarly, the received signal at Eve can be expressed as (8) where n e ∼ CN (0, σ 2 e I). According to (7) and (8) , the signalto-interference-plus-nose-ratio (SINR) at Bob and Eve can be, respectively, expressed as
and
As a consequence, the achievable secrecy rate at Bob is thus given by [16] : In this paper, we aim to maximize the secrecy rate at Bob subject to the transmit power constraints at the AF relay and each individual helper H k , k = 1, . . . , K. Therefore, our problem of interest is to:
Next, we define a new functionF ({Q k }, W ) as
Then we have the following proposition. Proposition 3.1: The optimal solution to (P1) is the same as that to the following problem:
Proof: Since the 'log' function does not change the monotonicity of the objective function, it can be easily shown that for the optimal solution {Q * k }, W * to (P1 ′ ), they are also optimal for (P1).
Hence, we focus on solving problem (P1 ′ ) in the rest of the paper. However, since (P1 ′ ) is in general a non-convex problem that is hard to solve, we will reformulate it into a two-stage optimization problem. First, we constrain the SINR at Eve to beγ e , it thus follows from (13) thatF ({Q k }, W ) is maximized when γ b is maximized, which can be obtained by solving the following problem:
Let H(γ e ) denote the optimal value of (P1 ′ .1) givenγ e . Then (P1 ′ ) can be equivalently solved by
To clarify the relation between problem (P1 ′ ) and (P1 ′ .1) ((P1 ′ .2)), we have the following lemma. 
B. Optimal Solution to (P1
In this subsection, we consider solving problem (P1 ′ .1) by jointly optimizing the covariance matrix for the AN at each of the HJ helper, Q k 's, and the beamforming matrix, W . To facilitate the analysis in the sequel, we rewrite the following equations in line with our definition of vec(·) [28, Chapter 13] :
Thus, γ b (c.f. (9)) and γ e (c.f. (10)) can be, respectively, expressed as
in which w = vec(W ),
Then by ignoring the rank-one constraint on X, Problem (P1 ′ .1-RW) is modified as follows.
Problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv) can be equivalently recast as the following problem via the well-known Charnes-Cooper transformation [29] .
To facilitate the analysis in the sequel, we first have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2:
The constraints in (24a) and (24b) can be replaced by σ
respectively, where both inequalities activate when problem (P1 ′ ) obtains its optimum value.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. Since problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) is a standard convex optimization problem and satisfies the Slater's condition, its duality gap with its dual problem is zero [30] . Now, let λ denote the dual variable associated with the equality constraint in (24a), α associated with the other equality constraint in (24b), β 0 associated with the transmit power constraint for the AF relay in (24c), {β k } associated with the power constraints for AN generated at each H k in (24d), and ζ associated with τ . Then the Lagrangian of problem (P1 (25) where Ω denotes the set consisting of all related primal and dual variables,
Next, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2:
The optimal solutions, (X * , {Q * k }, τ * ), to (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) satisfy the following conditions:
2) X * can be expressed as
where a n ≥ 0 ∀n, b > 0, r c = rank(C * ) (c.f. (83)) and
n=1 , which compose the set of orthonormal basis of null(C * );
3) According to (30) , if rank(X * ) > 1, then we have the following sufficient condition to yield an optimal solution of X with rank-one:
is also optimal to problem (P1
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. It ought to be noted from Proposition 3.2 that if rank(X * )= 1, then the optimal w * to (P1 ′ .1-RW) can be determined directly from the singular value decomposition (SVD) of X * , where X * = X * /τ * . Namely, the upper-bound optimum value obtained by solving problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) is tight in this case; otherwise, the optimal solution to problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) only serves as upper-bound solution in general.
In the following, we show that the upper-bound value for (P1 ′ .1-RW) is always achievable by a rank-one X. When rank(X * ) > 1, firstly, we check whether the sufficient condition proposed in (34) of Proposition 3.2 is satisfied. If the answer is yes, then a direct reconstruction of (X * , {Q * k },τ * ) with rank(X * ) = 1 can be followed according to (31) - (33); otherwise, assume that any optimal solution to problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) has no zero matrix component, i.e.,
In addition, the number of optimization variables and the number of shaping constraints are denoted by L and M , respectively. Since it is easy to see
has an optimal solution ofX * that is rank-one. Furthermore, the detailed rank reduction procedure based on solutions with arbitrary rank has been given in [31, Algorithm 1] . Note that in practice, if the condition in (34) holds, we proceed with (31)- (33) to obtain the rank-onê X * straightforwardly for its simplicity compared against the algorithm presented in [31, Algorithm 1].
C. Suboptimal Solution to
In this subsection, we propose a suboptimal relay beamforming matrix design for problem (P1 ′ .1) based on the investigation into the optimal structure of W [32,
Then express the truncated SVD of H 1 and H 2 , respectively, as
Thus, we present the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3:
The optimal relay beamforming matrix W for problem (P1 ′ .1) is of the form:
where B ∈ C 2×2 and C ∈ C 2×(Nt−2) are two unknown matrices, and U
, respectively. Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. Next, substitute (37) for W in (5), (9) and (10) and
complex variables to optimize, we devise a suboptimal design for C to reduce the size of variables by
and the transmit power at the relay in (5) can be further reduced to B
Accordingly, the suboptimal design for problem (P1 ′ .1) by ignoring the rank constraints is given by
Note that (P1 ′ .1-sub1-SDR) in general only provides the upper-bound solution but in this case, the tightness can be shown shortly.
Remark 3.1: Note that regarding the complexity in solving
, are of considerably reduced size. Furthermore, the reconstruction of v * from V can be briefly explained as follows. Given the Lagrangian of (P1 ′ .1-sub1-SDR), the KKT conditions w.r.t. V * are given by
Post-multiplying (39) with V * , we have (α * γ e |ḡ
is an arbitrary vector with unit norm. With V solved, (P1 ′ .1-sub1-SDR) reduces to a problem with similar structure as (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR), and thus the proof for the existence of a ran-one Z can be referred to Proposition 3.2.
IV. A JOINT OPTIMIZATION OF AN AND AF BEAMFORMING WITH IMPERFECT CSI

A. Problem Formulation for Imperfect CSI
In practice, since the AF relay is in charge of coordinating the CSI from all the nodes in order to implement the algorithm in a centralized fashion, its collection of CSIs from the kth helper to Bob (Eve), namely, g k 's andh k 's, is indirect and may be inaccurate due to Doppler effect. Even for the estimation of channels directly from the AF relay, i.e.,h 0 , g 0 , erroneous estimates occur as well due to the reasons mentioned in Section I. In the following, we use a deterministic spherical model [24, 25] to characterize the resulting CSIs' uncertainties such that 
Note that compared to (P1 ′ .2),F (γ e ) represents the actual value of
, which is no larger thanγ e , since this inequality may not be activated in the case of imperfect CSIs compared against that in the case of perfect CSIs (c.f. (15)). Hence, problem (P1
≤γ e , (43b)
As we can see, the constraints (43a), (43b) and (43d) involve semi-indefinite amount of uncertainties and thus problem (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) is in general intractable. In the following, we transform these constraints to tractable ones using the SProcedure. Specifically, we first recast (43a) and (43b) into linear matrix inequalities (LMI) to deal with the uncertainty ofh 0 (g 0 ); then we give propositions to model the LMI that can accommodate the channel uncertainties associated with H k , i.e.,h k (g k ), k = 1, . . . , K. In addition, without loss of generosity (w.l.o.g.), we write 
where
and c m ∈ R, and ℜ gives the real part of the input entity. Then the implication f 1 (x) ≥ 0 ⇒ f 2 (x) ≥ 0 holds if and only if there exists δ such that
provided that there exists a pointx such that f m (x) > 0, m = 1, 2.
To proceed, we equivalently transform (P2
(43a)-(43e)
Then by substituting f 1 =f 1 + ∆f 1 into P s tr(F 1 X) ≥ δ, we have
(48) In the following, first we incorporate the uncertainties involved in (43a) into the framework of S-Procedure. Note that (43a) includes semi-indefinite number of uncertainty from h 0 ,h k 's, which is in general intractable due to the multiple coexistent erroneous estimates of CSIs. Specifically, we adopt a conservative approach to accommodate uncertainties of all the related channels one by one. Given fixedh k 's, we have
where y 1 = vec(Y 1 ) and X ′ = I ⊗ X. By substituting
In order to make (51) tractable, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2: ([33, Theorem 3.5]):
The robust block quadratic matrix inequality (QMI),
is equivalent to 
, and s ′′(k) ≥ 0 denoting the auxiliary variable, k = 1, . . . , K.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. Next, we proceed to the robust design for (43b) so that the uncertainties involved in g 0 , g k 's can be accommodated effectively. Now, tr(F 2 X) in (43b) can be equivalently expressed as
where y 2 and X ′ denote vec(Y 2 ) and I ⊗ X, respectively. The uncertainty introduced by y 2 is thus related to that by g 0 as
. Therefore, by fixing the value of ∆g 0 2 and only considering the erroneous estimate w.r.t. y 2 , i.e., ∆y 2 , (43b) implies that
In order to incorporate the quadratic equality w.r.t. y 2 into the robust design, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3: ([33, Theorem 3.3]):
The robust QMI, C + X H B+B H X+X H AX≥ 0, for all X with E−X H DX = 0, is equivalent to
Proof: The lemma is an extension of [33, Proposition 3.2 (S-lemma, contour)]
and as a result its proof follows similar procedure as that for [33, Theorem 3.3.] except that if ξ = 0, we modify X = ηξ T (E 1/2 ) T , and thus we have
As a consequence, by applying Lemma 4.3, we know that (59) holds if and only if there exists a t, such that the following LMI is satisfied:
According to (62), by applying Lemma 4. 
. So far, in terms of the uncertainty introduced by g 0 , (43b) implies (63). To further consider the uncertainties of g k 's, (43b) can be reformulated as
By taking a similar approach as that for dealing with (51), (64) can be converted into an LMI constraint via the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2:
The constraint in (64) is guaranteed if and only if there exists s (k) , k = 1, . . . , K, such that the following LMI holds:
where H (k) and F (k) are recursively given by
,
where Since the proof is quite similar to that for Proposition 4.1, the detailed procedure is omitted here for brevity.
Last, we rewrite the constraints in (43d) to facilitate the robust optimization against the uncertainties of h k 's. By
By applying Lemma 4.1, (68) holds if and only if there exists µ k ≥ 0, such that the following LMI holds:
(69) As a result, the robust reformulation for problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) against imperfect CSI ofh 0 , h k 's,h k 's, g 0 and g k 's can be equivalently expressed as (48), (54), (65), (69),
is convex and can be solved efficiently by convex optimization tools such as CVX. Next, we derive the Lagrangian of problem (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR). Note that in the following expression, we only consider the uncertainties regardingh 0 , h k 's,h k 's, g 0 and g k 's when K = 1 for the purpose of simplicity and the results can easily be extended to the case of K > 1. Denote the dual variables associated with (43c), (48), (54), (65) and (69) by β 0 , W , V , Y and H 1 , respectively. Also, denote the dual variables for X 0 and Q 1 0 by Z 0 0 and Z 1 0, respectively. Then the partial Lagrangian of (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) w.r.t. X is given by
where Ω is the set consisting of all related primal and dual variables, and If the optimal X * for (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) yields a rankone solution, then it is the optimal solution to (P2 ′ .1-RW) with the rank constraint on X. Thus, w * can be obtained by SVD on X * as well. However, since the rank constraint has been ignored, the optimal X * to (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) in general only serves as an upper-bound solution. Hence, when rank(X * ) > 1, we present a suboptimal scheme with a reconstructedX * always satisfying rank(X * ) = 1, which is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3:
1) The optimal X * to problem (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) can be expressed as
whereā n ≥ 0, ∀n,b > 0, and ξ ∈ C N 2 t ×1 is a unit-norm vector orthogonal toΞ. 2) According to (73), if rank(X * ) > 1, i.e., there exists at least oneā n > 0, we reconstruct a solution to problem (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) usinĝ
while {Q * k } are obtained by solving the following feasibility problem provided thatX * ,δ * , andτ * are given by (74), (75) and (76), respectively:
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical examples to validate our results. We consider a two-phase AF relay wiretap channel in flat-fading for a SWIPT system in which Alice transmits confidential messages to Bob in the presence of one eavesdropper, Eve, with the assistance of K HJ helpers. As described in the system model in Section II, Alice, Bob and Eve are all equipped with single antenna while the K helpers and the AF relay are assumed to have the same number of antennas, i.e., N t . We assume a typical scenario where the K helpers are evenly distributed around Alice with a radius of ρ k = 2m and θ k = 2π(k−1) K (radian by default), where θ k is the angle of direction (w.r.t. the Alice-relay link by default) of the kth helper, k = 1, . . . , K. Alice, Bob and Eve are, w.l.o.g., assumed to have the same distance away from the AF relay with their angle of direction 0, π/6 and 11π/6, respectively.
We also assume channel models with both large-scale fading, i.e., path loss and shadowing, and small-scale fading, i.e., multi-path fading. The simplified large-scale fading model is given by [34] 
where z is a log-normal random variable capturing the effect of shadowing with the standard derivation σ = 8dB [35] , A 0 = 1, d is the distance, d 0 is a reference distance set to be 1m, and α = 3 is the path loss exponent. Specifically, the channels between Alice and each individual helper, H k , and those to/from the AF relay, i.e., h 0 ,h 0 and g 0 , are assumed to suffer from Rician fading while the channels from the HJ helpers to Bob and Eve follow Rayleigh distribution due to the missing of ling-of-sight (LOS) components with their respective average gain specified by (77). Take h k , ∀k, as an example, (77)),ȟ k is the Rayleigh fading component denoted byȟ k ∼ CN (0, DI), and K R is the Rician factor set to be 3. Note that for the involved LOS component, we use the far-field uniform linear antenna array to model the channels [36] . In addition, K is set to be 5; the AF relay is assumed to be 10m away from Alice; the EH efficiency, η = 0.5 and σ 
A. The Perfect CSI Case
In this subsection, we present numerical results in the perfect CSI case. We compare the proposed optimal solutions with two suboptimal schemes. One of the suboptimal schemes, denoted by "Suboptimal 1", is introduced in Section III-C by exploiting the optimal structure of W . The other conventional suboptimal scheme known as zero-forcing, denoted by "Suboptimal 2", generally works well in the scenarios of perfect CSI known at the transmitter. Specifically, each jamming beam n k is restricted to lie in the orthogonal space ofh † k , i.e.,h T k n k = 0, ∀k, such that n k 's cause no interference to the legitimate receiver. Define a projection matrix
, whose truncated SVD is expressed as J k = U k U H k . As such, the optimal AN beam is given by n k = U kñk , whereñ k ∈ C (Nt−1)×1 is a CSCG random variable denoted
, with n k 's decided as above, (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) can be solved w.r.t. only one variable, X.
First, we study the secrecy rate at the IR versus the distance from Alice to the AF relay (the same as that from the AF relay to Bob/Eve), with N t set to 3 and 5, respectively. It is assumed that P s = 1W or 30dBm and P r = 1mW or 0dBm. Fig. 2 shows the average secrecy rate by different schemes for (P1 ′ ). It is observed that the secrecy rate of the joint optimal scheme is well achieved by the proposed suboptimal solutions and the zero-forcing solutions. Moreover, with N t increasing, the average secrecy rate gets larger as a result of the higher array gain of the AF relay and more available power for jamming at the HJ helpers.
Next, we study the secrecy rate at the receiver versus the transmit power of the transmitter, P s with P r = 0dBm. Fig. 3 demonstrates that for both cases of N t = 3 and N t = 5, the average secrecy rate increases and tends to be saturated as P s becomes larger. It also shows that "suboptimal 1" and "suboptimal 2" closely approach the optimal solutions. Furthermore, the outperforming of the secrecy rate with N t = 5 against that with N t = 3 is also observed for the same reason as stated for Fig. 2 .
At last, we show in Fig. 4 the secrecy rate achieved by different schemes versus the transmit power of the AF relay, P r with P s = 10dBm. It is seen that the average secrecy rate first grows faster and then slower, since when P r increases, not only the desired signal but also the noise yielded form the first transmission phase is amplified to a larger extent. In addition, the performance gap between the optimal scheme and two suboptimal ones is almost negligible as seen from Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 .
B. The Imperfect CSI Case
In this subsection, we present the numerical results in the imperfect CSI case. We compare the proposed robust optimization scheme (the upper-bound solutions and the rankone achieved solutions) against some benchmark schemes. (11) is evaluated by applying the optimal solutions to (P1 ′ .1) assuming perfect CSI, to the actual channels including errors, which are picked up from the sets defined in (41). Also note that for generally verifying the secrecy performance in the worst case, consistent with the principle of robust optimization defined by deterministic uncertainty, we introduce the following performance metric, namely, 100p%-secrecy outage probability, which is defined as [37] :
where r * 0 is obtained by solving (P2 ′ ). Besides the parameters identical to those of perfect CSI case, regarding the deterministic channel uncertainty model defined in (41), we introduce the channel uncertainty ratios associated with ǫ 0 , ǫ Fig . 5 depicts the empirical cumulative density function (CDF) of the achievable (outage) secrecy rate from 1000 samples, in which P r = 0dBm, P s = 10dBm, N t = 3 and K = 5. Given the probability value p, according to (78), the corresponding secrecy rate of the x-axis indicates the 100p%-(secrecy) outage capacity. It is observed that below an outage probability of 90%, the (secrecy) outage capacity achieved by the proposed solutions for (P2 ′ ) surpass that obtained by benchmark schemes, i.e., "Robust w/o HJ" and "Nonrobust with HJ". For example, the "Robust with HJ" can still achieve a secrecy capacity of about 1.8bps/Hz with the outage probability less than 5% versus that of approximate 1.1bps/Hz, 0bps/Hz for the "Non-robust with HJ" and "Robust w/o HJ", respectively. Furthermore, the suboptimal solutions with rankone X well achieve their upper-bound SDR solutions with negligible difference. Fig. 6 illustrates the empirical CDF of the achievable (outage) secrecy rate for different number of HJ helpers from 1000 samples, in which P r = 0dBm, P s = 9.4dBm and N t = 3. It is observed that suboptimal solutions of "Robust with HJ" almost achieve their upper-bound SDR solutions of "Robust upper with HJ" throughout the whole range of (secrecy) outage probability. Moreover, the "Robust w/o HJ" scheme achieves less secrecy outage rate than "Robust with HJ" schemes, in particular, when the outage probability falls within about 10%-20%. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note that consecutively increasing the number of HJ helpers will improve the secrecy rate yet to a limited extent, since more helpers for jamming may introduce larger interference to the legitimate receiver as well due to the channel estimates error, which suggests that in practice, only a couple of HJ helpers are sufficiently helpful. Fig. 7 shows two different levels of secrecy outage capacity versus the normalized channel estimates error in terms of α 0 (α k 's), in which P r = 0dBm, P s = 0dBm, N t = 3 and K = 5. It is observed that the (secrecy) outage capacity decreases slowly with the eavesdropper's CSI uncertainty ratios, which validates the robustness of the proposed transmission solutions. Besides, the 20%-outage capacity achieved by different schemes is apparently larger than its 10% counterpart. Moreover, it is also worth noting that the advantage of the HJ protocol is more significant when the secrecy outage probability decreases from 20% to 10%, since the HJ protocol provides more degree of freedom for robustness designs against the imperfect CSIs and thus guarantees larger worst-case secrecy rate. Fig. 8 evaluates the 100p%-secrecy outage capacity for p = 25 and p = 50, respectively, versus the transmit power at the AF relay. Specifically, we set P s = 10dBm N t = 3 and K = 5. As observed similarly from Fig. 7 , with the higher requirement for the secrecy outage, the robust scheme with the assistance of HJ helpers performs worse than its counterpart with more tolerant secrecy outage probability, though, considerably better than solutions without HJ helpers. The reasonably near-optimal performance of the "Robust with HJ" schemes are also seen as from Figs. 5-7.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper considered improving the secret wireless communications in a multi-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF) relay wiretap channel via a novel cooperative jamming protocol, harvest-and-jam (HJ), which motivates the multi-antenna friendly helpers to confound the eavesdropper by generating the artificial noise (AN) at no extra power cost. The AN covariance matrices and the AF relaying matrix were jointly optimized to maximize the achievable secrecy rate at the destination subject to the transmit power constraints, on both perfect and imperfect channel state information (CSI) occasions. These non-convex problems were solved by a twostage algorithm using the technique of semidefinite relaxation (SDR). The optimality of the SDR was shown and based on that a low complexity suboptimal solution was also designed for the case of perfect CSI while for the case of imperfect CSI, we developed a new robust optimization scheme that is able to accommodate channel uncertainties for an arbitrary number of HJ helpers. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed schemes were evaluated by numerical results.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3.2
To prove this, we first formulate an auxiliary problem by only replacing "=" with "≤" in (24a) and name it problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR (1) ), of which the optimal solution and the optimum value are denoted byX * , {Q * k },τ * andf * 0 , respectively. Besides, denote the optimal value for (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv) and (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) asf * 0 and f * 0 , respectively. Since the optimum value of (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR (1) ) is no smaller than that of (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) for its enlarged feasible region w.r.t. (24a), we havef * 0 ≥ f * 0 =f * 0 . On the other hand, the solution of {X * /τ * ,Q * k /τ * } is easily seen to satisfy the constraints in (23) and thus feasible for (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv), which yields the objective valuē
. Due to the fact of
holds by combining the above two facts, so "=" in (24a) can be equivalently replaced by "≤".
Next, to facilitate the proof, another auxiliary problem is considered by replacing "=" with "≤ in (24b), and is denoted by (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR (2) ). In line with (15), P1 ′ can also be solved by one-dimension search forγ e via (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR (2) ) as follows.
wheref (γ e ) represents the optimal value for (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR (2) ) givenγ e , andg(γ e ) is given bỹ
where {X * ,Q * k ,τ * } denotes the optimal solution to (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR (2) 
, which violates the optimality ofγ * e and thereforeg(γ * e ) =γ * e . In a sum, "=" in (24b) can be equivalently replaced by "≤" for (24b) as well, which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Proposition 3.2
First, the KKT conditions of problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) are given by
t − r c + 1. This indicates that besides the basis in Ξ, null(A * ) spans over an extra dimension of basis, which is denoted by ξ, and thus X * = N 2 t −rc n=1 a n η n η H n + bξξ H .
Finally, we prove that if the condition in (34) holds, there always exists a solution with rank-one X that achieves the same optimum value as (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR). Assume that (X * , {Q * k }, τ * ) is the optimal solution to (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) with rank(X * ) > 1. Then construct a new solution {X * ,Q * k ,τ * } according to (31)- (33) . In the following, we check if the reconstructed solution is feasible for (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) provided that (34) holds. First, 
Next, assume that the precedent k − 1 (k ≥ 2) uncertainties have been considered for (51), i.e., 
and thus (46a) holds true, which implies that the same optimal value as (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR), i.e., δ * , is achievable. However, since the constraint in (43b) , and thus suboptimal for (P2 ′ ).
